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Introduction
This paper presents a simple model of the effect of "increasing demand risk" on investment. A primary motivation for developing this model comes from the financial pages of the daily press in which the depressive effect of (increasing) uncertainty on investment is continually asserted.
Such an effect is not at all obvious; nonetheiess, one can find ample support for this position 1n the academic journals. The standard model in the literature examines the question of how output price uncertainty affects the competitive firm's demand for labor and capital within a stylized, singleperiod framework and derives the result that a risk-averse competitive firm will decrease output in response to increased price uncertainty with a corresponding decrease in factor demands, excepting the case of inferior faetors. (See, e g, Batra and Ullah (1974) .) The behavior of a risk-neutral firm is not affected by inereased priee uneertainty.
The intuition that inereased uneertainty operating through the risk preferenees of entrepreneurs has a general eontractionary effect may have some validity, but it is hard to believe that this is more than a seeondorder effeet. The existence ef uneertainty has more direct and obvious effeets on the produetion decisrons of firms; in particular, there is a need for flexibility in the presenee of uncertainty.
Our model is buiit around this idea of fiexibility as a response to unce:r;tainty. We eonsider a firm whieh has an ex ante constant returns to seale produetion funetion reiating capacity to eapital and labor services.
Ex post the firm faees a striet elay reiationship --output is proportional to employment up to the capacity limit. Input and output priees are fixed and known with eertainty, but the quantity the firm will be able to sell is assumed to be eonstrained by the level of effeetive demand, arandom variable. The firm thus faces two types of risk. If demand expands by more than expected, the firm risks losing profitable sales due to insufficient capacity; while if demand expands by less than expected, the firm risks paying for capital services which are not fully utilized. The interpretation that comes out of this putty-clay framework is that the firm can simultaneously hedge against both of these risks. The firm can hedge against underexpansion relative to demand by increasing capacity beyond the level which would otherwise be optimal while at the same time hedging against overexpansion by biasing its production techniques towards flexibility in the form of reduced capital intensity.
Our model ~n effect intergrates two existing approaches to capturing the direct effect of uncertainty on investment. In one type of model (e g, Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971) or Hartman (1976) ) uncertainty has a direct effect on expected profits through the short-run fixity of capital services.
Ex ante the firm face s a production function in capital and labor services; ex post the firm faces the same production function, but with the level of capital services fixed. In a second class of model (e g, Ch 5 of Nickell (1978) ) an ex ante choice of investment ~s identical to a choice of capacity, and the question is one of the degree of excess capacity needed to cope with uncertainty.
Our model is ~n the same spirit as these papers in the sense that uncertainty produces real effects without recourse to the rather artificial device of risk aversion, yet the putty-clay approach represents a quite diffe rent way of introducing these effects. The putty-clay approach emphasizes the flexibility inherent in excess capacity, while at the same time allowing scope for input substitution via variations in the capital-intensity of capacity.
In the next two sections we develop these ide as more precisely within the context of a simple model. However, before proceeding a strong caveat should be registered. This whole genre of model might weil be dismissed on the grounds that what is being investigated lS the effect of an increase in uncertainty about an endogenous variable. The response of risk-averse competitive firms to an increase in price uncertainty (from whatever exogenous source) will obviously have an effect on pr1ce itself, and an analogous feedback effect will operate in our model. However, one must recognize the pervasiveness of "partial-partial" thinking, and for didactic reasons we express our disagreement with the conventional wisdom within that framework. One hopes of course that some of the intuition suggested by these models carrie s over to a more fully specified equilibrium context.
The Model
Consider a firm taking decisions for an about-to-commence installation period which bear upan production during an ensuing operating period. The firm faces an ex ante constant returns to scale production function relating capacity to labor services and investment. Ex~, in the opera ting period, the firm faces a clay production function that equates the outputicapacity ratio to the ratio of employment to labor requirements at full capacity. Of course, this clay relationship on ly holds for outputicapacity ratios between zero and one. These production assumptions should be interpreted as applying to the installation of new capacity, ie, the model abstracts from any interactions between this new capacity and any pre-existing capacity. Either "independence of vintages" or investment in completely new operations (ie, the absence of any prc-existing capacity) is assumed.
The firm is assumed to face fixed prices for its output and inputs which are denominated in operating period te~:s 3nd which are known with certainty. However, the firm faces a demand constraint in the sense that the CIuantity it will be able to sell will be equal to the lesser of capacity and an amount imposed by effective demand, and the level of this effective demand constraint is assumed to be arandom variable_o
The following notation will be used throughout: , This inverse function exhibits constant returns to scale and its partiaI derivatives satisfy In interpreting these derivatives it is useful to note that n is the reciprocal c of the marginal product of labor and that -nk is the marginal rate of substitution, 
l c (l --!F(x}dx) (pc-wn(c,k» -rk. 
Results
We want to tn~estigate the effect of increasing gemand risk on the ~ir~'s opera,tions. First, nate. that increasing demand risk is indeed "bad for business"; i e, increasing demand risk will a1ways have a deleteriQus effect on expected profits. Under no circumstances can the firm adjust c and k to mo~e than offset the increase in risk.
Proposition 1: Expected profits are non-increasing in e.
Proof: (i) Let II*(6) = max E[II(c,k;6>]. By the "envelope theorem" c,k
But because II* > O we have pc -wn(c,k) > O, and ge(c,e) 2 O by (llc).
(ii)Alternative1y, equation (6) revea1s that profits are concave in x.
Therefore, the RothschildjStiglitz (1971) resu1ts based on Jensen's Inequality imply that expected profits are non-increasing in 8.
To investigate the effect of increasing demand risk on investment we decompose the effect of increasing risk into two effects. At the optimum,k may be expressed as a function of e and of the optimal value of c (itself a function of e); ie r ' (ii) An alternative proof is useful since it reveals the terms comprising (l3}. Maximizing E [ITTc,kie) ] with respect to c and k yields the first-order conditions
;::: o.
Differentiating either (14a) or (l4b) with respect to e allows us to identify the terms of (13). In particular, differentiating (14b) with respect to e yields Therefore, Ck\ = -ge(c,e)n k (c,k)/9(c,8)n kk (c,k) i and so by (2) and (Il), the as . c
capital-intensity effect is non-positive.
To investigate the capacity-expansion effect we will impose an additional assumptioni namely, that the increase in demand risk does not increase the probability that the benchmark capacity will be adequate to meet demand, That is, we assume that <lF(c, S) < O.
ae -
Proposition ~ Assuming that an increase in demand risk dOGS not increase the probability that the benchmark capacity will be adequate to meet demand, an increase in demand risk cannot decrease the optimal capacity. That is, dF(c,e)/ae < O implies dc/dO.:. O.
Proof: The proof consists of differentiating the first-order conditions, (l4a,b), and solving for dc/de. The details are given in the appendix.
The above result establishes that under plausible conditions increasing demand risk implies an increase in the optimal level of capacity. This need not, however, le ad to the conclusion that increasing demand risk implies a positive capacity-expansion effect on investment since for such to be the case it needs also to be true that an increase in capacity induces an increase in investment, all else equal. Our final proposition gives a simple sufficient condition that ensures this. 
Conclusion
The major part of the existing literature predicts that increasing risk will, decrease investment or at best leave levels of investment unchanged, pathologi~al cases aside.1The notion that "uncertainty is b<:td for investment" is also prevalent in the business press. The practical importance of the putty-clay approach to this problem is to challenge this conventionai wisdom by revealing the potential expansionary effects of increasing risk.
These results ought not to seem counter-intuitive. As demonstrated in Stigler 1 One might similarly suspect that an increase in investment in response to increasing demand risk would only represent a pathological outcome in our model. To see that such is not the case, consider the example of a fixed coefficients ex ante technology. In this case the capital-intensity effect is completely absent, andinvestment necesarily increases so long as~(c,e)/ae < O. Small deviations from fixed coefficients 1e, limited substitution possibilities,-obviously will produce the same result. Note' that with a fixed coefficients technology our model essentially reduces to Example Sa of Nickell (1978) . Since nck(e,k} = -~nkk(c,k) (from the proof of Proposition. 3) nk(c,k)/e ~ nck(e,k} iff nk(c,k) > -knkk(c,k). ::nk\c,k)k Next, O ~ 1 implies d ( ~(c,k) )/dk ~ O. But,
